Would it make sense for Britain to rejoin the single market?
John Major, his reputation greatly enhanced since he left office in 1997, has called for the UK to rejoin the European Union’s single market (not the EU itself) on a five-year horizon.
Major and Tony Blair formed an informal “premier league” team during the 2016 Brexit referendum, and campaigned hard for Remain. Now Major, accepting the reality of the government’s red lines, is pointing the way to a closer relationship with – and within – Europe.
Of course. Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland are already in this category, as are some sectors of Switzerland’s economy.
There would have to be a negotiation. It would be more difficult for the UK than for other countries outside the EU, because the UK is a far larger economy – and because of the situation in Northern Ireland, which is already inside the EU single market and the EU customs union, with its own bespoke arrangements, which may complicate things. But it is perfectly possible in principle, with trust and goodwill.
That the UK would accept all of the EU’s relevant laws and regulations as they evolve, along with free movement of labour and capital. There would be no restrictions on the movement of goods, or other non-tariff impediments to trade. This is called “dynamic alignment”.
A contribution to the EU budget for its various social and economic programmes is normal, so, for example, Norway pays about £500m a year – but the UK population, and its GDP, are multiples larger than Norway’s, so it would likely run into billions per annum. But the benefits to economic growth would be even bigger, if as yet unquantified. They would fit on the side of a bus, in any case.
A new, pressing problem is the EU’s draft “Made in Europe” strategy, a protectionist move, which threatens to do serious damage to the UK’s automotive industry and other sectors.
If it remained outside the customs union, the UK would be free to pursue trade deals with others, though there would need to be some controls on products that don’t meet EU standards being re-exported to the EU. Fisheries could also be excluded – though the Brexit treaty does already cover EU access to British waters.
There would be no obligation in principle to join the euro, to agree to other EU policies, such as on refugees, or to take part in the EU’s political structures. Services, important for the UK, are less of an issue for the single market, and the City has not been too adversely affected by Brexit – some would say it thrives outside the EU rulebook (albeit arguably running more risks).
From the British side, there’s the fundamental problem that some EU laws and rules clash with emerging UK national priorities. This is notably the case with genetically modified/edited crops and organisms, which the UK is slightly more accommodating of, and the regulation of artificial intelligence and the whole digital sphere, where Britain cleaves more to American laissez-faire.
While the UK might have influence over Brussels, it would still have to abide by rules made without its having had a decisive voice in the matter. As Kemi Badenoch described the current government’s moves to adopt some dynamic alignment in UK law, it means “becoming a rule-taker from Brussels once again” (but this time without votes in the ruling EU Council of Ministers and the European parliament). The role of the European Court of Justice is another bugbear.
From the EU side, one novel problem is that they cannot be confident that any deals won’t be ripped up by a change of government, either at an election or through a new PM being appointed via internal party manoeuvres – doing the hokey-cokey runs against their culture, and the UK is visibly unstable. Bluntly, there’s no point in any of this if Nigel Farage, or even Badenoch, is committed to scrapping it.
Quite attractive for the British, but troublesome for the EU. As the orbit of EU regulation has expanded since Switzerland negotiated its special relationship in 1993, after the single market was formed (in most sectors), well over 120 selective bilateral agreements across various industries and markets have had to be worked on and constantly kept up to date. The EU Commission regards this as unsatisfactory, and would be unwilling to do the same for other countries, especially one as large – and frankly, awkward – as the UK.
Switzerland is a member of the Schengen passport-free area, which helps matters, and allows full free movement of workers from EU nations – neither of these is an appealing prospect to the many British voters who are concerned about migration.
Rather quietly, he actually started to push the UK into some aspects of the single market. The “reset” was a manifesto commitment specifically focused on an SPS (sanitary and phyto-sanitary) agreement, which was to cover all trade in, and movements of, broadly organic materials, known as “agrifoods” – from livestock to cheese to pot plants and smoked salmon.
This was settled in outline at last year’s EU-UK summit, from which emerged the UK-EU Strategic Partnership. To facilitate it, the King’s Speech promised a new law to allow ministers to accept EU rules in certain areas.
Starmer has also tried to get the electricity market, a youth experience scheme, mutual recognition of professional qualifications, coordinating irregular migration operations, defence and security, plus other matters – not all strictly “single market” related – on the table.
If he becomes prime minister, Andy Burnham will take forward Starmer’s agenda – and here, perhaps in contrast to other controversies, he will have his MPs fully behind him. Before too long he will be at the next annual UK-EU summit, and much work has gone into a number of bespoke schemes.
The real question, implied by John Major’s five-year timeline, is what goes into Labour’s next manifesto commitment.
In the long run, yes. Already, many of those who voted Leave have passed on, while others have changed their minds, and the young are vastly more pro-European – which is reflected in all the polling. Sooner or later, the political classes will have to bow to public opinion.
It turns out that 2016, on that slim 52-48 per cent vote, was really the last chance, generationally speaking, to get out of the EU – but not for ever.