How could Britain rejoin the EU, assuming it would be allowed back?
New minister for Europe, Hamish Falconer, has dropped some hefty hints that Labour’s next election manifesto could go much further than in 2024 on moving Britain back towards the European Union.
Falconer, a new MP but already a skilled operator, didn’t say anything inconsistent with present policy; but rather than nervously shutting down any question of rejoining the EU, as his predecessor Nick Thomas-Symonds might have, Falconer has opened up an argument about an ambitious change.
Answering questions from Sophie Ridge on Sky News, Falconer said what appears at first glance to be a mere truism: “What we do in our next manifesto will be a question for the Labour Party.” But context is everything – “refusing to rule it out” is the story. It speaks of a bolder approach and a keener edge than in the cagey Starmer era.
He even offered a nascent version of the pro-EU argument. Going beyond the usual point that Brexit has failed, Falconer argues that things are different more broadly: “The world has changed since 2016. We need to make sure that our relationship with Europe changes too. Europe and the UK both face real challenges.”
Nothing new since entering No 10, and he doesn’t want to open up the issue just yet, but he did remark during the Makerfield by-election that he favoured rejoining. He later retreated slightly: “My view is that Brexit has been damaging, but I also believe the last thing we should do right now is rerun those arguments." A bit self-contradictory.
Options are endless, except that the exact same and highly beneficial range of special arrangements in place in 2016 won’t be available. Joining the EU single market and/or the customs union are initial options, rather than taking on full membership. Extending the current de facto partial membership of the Single Market to other sectors of the economy via “dynamic alignment” of rules is another possibility, though the EU dislikes such complexity (Switzerland is the only nation that seeks to operate such an irksome regime).
EU Brexit negotiator, Michel Barnier, has suggested Britain could rejoin and secure opt-outs from the euro and the Schengen free-movement zone – but budget contributions, pooled sovereignty, fisheries and industrial protection would have to be in the mix. Critically, the UK would certainly have to accept freedom of movement of labour, an aspect of immigration that proved a major driver of the Leave vote a decade ago.
It is arguable that free movement – which works both ways – is a downside. More certain is that the new free trade deals with India, Australia, Japan and the US (fragile as it is) would have to go. Britain would also have to tighten up regulation of the City and AI, which could lead to a loss of competitiveness.
No, and it may be significant that Falconer mentioned the prospective 2028-29 Labour manifesto, suggesting perhaps that an election mandate would be enough to begin the process.
Constitutionally, there’s no need for any plebiscite. Britain was taken into the then European Communities in 1972 on the basis of the 1970 manifesto upon which the then Conservative government had won a general election. It didn’t even commit to joining.
The lesson of the post-Brexit referendum period is that only a general election such as the “Get Brexit Done” contest of December 2019 could settle the matter; the 2016 vote in itself was not enough to pass the necessary legislation.
On the one hand, a manifesto promise to rejoin in principle on the best terms available could mean a weak mandate for such a major change – say, Labour winning in 30 per cent of the vote on a 60 per cent turnout, meaning 18 per cent of the voters. But if you add in all the other pro-EU parties’ votes and Commons seats, the mandate would look far more substantial: Labour plus Liberal Democrats, Greens, SNP, Plaid Cymru, plus some of the Northern Ireland parties. The new terms could simply be passed by parliament (as in 1972 and, in reverse, in 2019).
The real question is whether the country can face more European-based traumas, whatever the process.
A few years, given the continuing overlap in laws under the Brexit treaty. It would be gruelling.
A question the British so rarely ask. The words emanating from Europe are warm, but the reality is that a member state going in and out every decade or two is an unattractive, indeed unworkable, prospect for Brussels. Only with evidence of a clear and overwhelming shift in British public opinion would re-entry be contemplated as a secure basis for renegotiation.
When support for re-entry approaches 70 per cent things could be done; another 52/48 decision would be disastrous.